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Introduction
A good deal of attention has been recently focused on the presumed advertising
excesses of the healthcare industry in its promotion techniques to healthcare
professionals, whether through offering gratuities such as gifts,1 honoraria, or
travel support2"6 or through deception.7 Two basic concerns have been expressed:
Does the acceptance of gratuities bias the recipient, tainting his or her responsi-
bilities as the patient's agent? Does acceptance of the gratuity by the healthcare
professional contribute to the high cost of healthcare products? The California
Society of Hospital Pharmacists was recently asked by its members to formulate
a policy for an appropriate relationship between the Society and the healthcare
industry, addressing these concerns. In formulating its policy, it became clear
that the Society depended on healthcare industry support, gathered through
journal advertising, fees for booths at its various educational events, and grants
for speakers.
On its face, acceptance by the Society of any support would seem to pose
problems of bias for its members (and the patients they serve) and to be cost
increasing.8 With bias come problems with ethical principles of autonomy, benef-
icence, and nonmaleficence. By engaging in activities that may increase patients'
costs, healthcare professionals may induce problems with nonmaleficence, be-
neficence, and justice.
In the following discussion we evaluate the appropriateness of the Society's
policy by exploring the consensus view of advertising and promotion, the role
of advertising, how prices are set by the healthcare industry, and the ethical
problems that occur at the intersection of advertising practices and healthcare
practice and propose some solutions— relevant to the Society's policy—to the
observed problems.
A Consensus View of Advertising and Promotion
The issue of industry promotion has received considerable attention by Congress.
During recent hearings of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee,
testimony was given revealing all-expense-paid trips to Monte Carlo or Acapulco
for physician attendance at industry-sponsored educational symposia, induce-
ments of $1,200 to physicians for prescribing expensive antibiotics to patients
participating in a "clinical study," frequent flyer miles for prescriptions,9 or an
$8 reimbursement to pharmacists for switching patients from one brand of an
oral hypoglycemic agent to another.10 More subtle inducements have entailed
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Societies and Healthcare Industry Ethical Conflicts
inclusion of good prescribers in speakers bureau listings, provision of research
monies, and provision of packaged educational symposia to healthcare associa-
tions (topic, speaker, festivities, etc.). A common theme in articles written to point
out the conflict established by a healthcare professional's accepting these induce-
ments is that they are cost increasing for the therapy provided.11'12
In addition to concerns that healthcare industry promotional activities may be
cost increasing, there is the suggestion that the information presented in some
promotional activities is biased or one sided. In a study by Wilkes etah, 109 full-
page advertisements in 10 leading medical journals were evaluated using U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) criteria. The authors concluded that the
advertisements would, in 44% of cases, lead to improper prescribing if the phy-
sician had no other information than that contained in the ad.13 Stern et ahu
described a report distributed by the manufacturer of an immunosuppressive
agent promoting its use in the treatment of psoriasis — an unapproved use. One
hundred dollars was provided to dermatologists completing a quiz on the report.
Under current FDA regulations, information contained in labeling (any written,
printed, or graphic matter upon or accompanying the drug; generally, the pack-
age insert or the information found in the Physician's Desk Reference) or in adver-
tisements must not be false or misleading in any particular or fail to reveal any
material fact. Indications that are not FDA approved ("off-label") are considered
to be false and misleading.15 Although targets of biased advertising protest that
they can discern chaff from wheat,16 Avorn et al.17 showed that physician beliefs
about promotional susceptibility and actual prescribing practice differ. They found
that physicians relied on promotional information (e.g., advertisements, detail
personnel) rather than scientific information available through published clinical
trials or review articles. Soumerai and Avorn18 also showed that these influences
can be countered with "academic detailing," where approved, unbiased infor-
mation is provided.
Another concern is that industry-sponsored educational events and journal
supplements (e.g., symposium issues) may lack rigor and balance. FDA attempts
to distinguish between industry-sponsored "educational" and "promotional"
activities based on factors such as 1) the "independence" of the event from the
sponsor, 2) long-term financial relationships between the sponsor and speakers,
3) control of the agenda and speaker selection, 4) audience selection, and
5) whether lay media versus scientific media representatives are present.19 If it
finds that an event tends more toward promotion than education, FDA may use
its regulatory authority to take action against the sponsoring firm. Although there
is a regulatory limitation on advertising content, enforcement may be less effec-
tive than desired. The study of published industry-sponsored symposia, where
Bero et al. found that the publications frequently had misleading titles and had
been subjected to a lower level of peer review than the parent journal,20 has find-
ings that parallel those of Wilkes et al.
Industry expenditures for advertising and promotion are substantial. Lazenby
and Letsch projected 1991 pharmaceutical marketing expenditures at $10 billion
on a $45 billion sales base, or about 22% of sales.21 Hurwitz and Caves noted
that for pharmaceutical firms with high research and development budgets, sales
promotion expense may be as high as 30% of sales: 70% for "detailing" to physi-
cians, pharmacists, and other healthcare professionals, 27% to journals.22 In a
study by Leffler, the influence of informational versus promotional advertising
on a firm's advertising to sales ratio was examined.23 He showed that returns
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from promotional advertising were high compared with returns from informa-
tional advertising.
The consensus view of advertising and promotion is that healthcare industry
expenditures are excessive and may be cost increasing. Also, the information
provided is biased. Although healthcare practitioners do not believe that they
are influenced by advertising and promotions, studies have demonstrated their
effectiveness and, for some, their bias.
Role of Advertising
A contemporary view of advertising is that most of it stresses "puffery'' —giving
prominence to attributes of negligible value. Few would acknowledge that adver-
tising has a legitimate role in a business enterprise: providing information. Lef-
fler described two polar views of the effects and value of advertising.23 For one,
the "Harvard View" developed by Chamberlin, advertising is described as a
means for creating artificial product differentiation, informational confusion, and
in consequence, barriers to market entry by competitors. In such a market, com-
petition would be expected to be decreased and consumer prices increased. This
"adverse view" of promotional advertising suggests that it is meant to fool con-
sumers24 into selecting a product that, were they better informed, they would
not choose. If two products are viewed as perfect substitutes (e.g., an otherwise
identical generic and brand-name drug), price competition will tend to hold down
the consumer's price. If advertising succeeds in differentiating the two products
by suggesting quality difference, the consumer may be willing to pay a higher
price for the perceived quality difference. Promotional advertising can also satu-
rate the consumer so that existence of the lower priced product is not appreci-
ated.25 The other view, the "Chicago View" developed by Telser, stresses the
value of advertising in providing information, promoting competition, and in
select markets, lowering consumer prices.26 This "partial view" of advertising
suggests that it provides consumers "information" about a product's existence,
availability, price, and attributes such as quality. Informational advertising reduces
the consumers' search costs,27 allowing them to better select between manufac-
turers. Price competition is fostered with informational advertising.28
Can these polar views of advertising be applied to healthcare promotion? As
noted by Kessler and Pines, the FDA can take regulatory action against manufac-
turers that promote unapproved drug uses, but the distinction between dissemi-
nation of information and promotion may be subtle. The FDA has been struggling
with the distinction for some years and has offered several iterations of a Draft
Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientific and Education Activities.29
In the Draft Policy, the FDA acknowledged "[t]wo important sources of infor-
mation on therapeutic products . . . (1) activities (programs and materials) pro-
duced by the companies that market the products and (2) independent scientific
and educational activities, such as continuing medical education.30 The FDA
attempts to distance itself from regulating scientific and educational activities
of manufacturers but emphasizes its authority over nonscientific promotional
activities.
Two kinds of advertising have been described: the promotional type, where
quality differences of little merit are emphasized, and the informational type. The
FDA's policies, in effect, attempt to regulate the former but not the latter.
238
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e .
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
4:
57
:3
9,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s .
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
09
63
18
01
00
00
49
77
Societies and Healthcare Industry Ethical Conflicts
Price of Products — Healthcare Industry Behavior
How do the promotional activities of the healthcare industry influence the price
of its products? A description of the pricing behavior of the healthcare industry
demands both basic concepts from, disciplines such as financial management and
cost accounting and some specific information about the industry itself. How-
ever, firm-specific information on price-setting behavior is largely proprietary.31
A simplified description of the healthcare industry's price-setting behavior
includes the following sequence. Firms have various costs of doing business
that are often described as "fixed" and include expenses such as administration,
research and development, and marketing. "Fixed costs," a concept derived from
the accounting literature, are those that one expects to incur in the short run and
that are independent of manufacturing volume given the firm's production capa-
bilities. In making a decision to pursue a new product, the firm evaluates the
cost of acquiring or producing the product, the price it expects it will be able to
charge for that product, the number of units likely to be sold, and the product's
contribution to fixed costs. If the profit the firm can make by selling the product
under these conditions meets management goals, the project goes forward.32"34
In this sequence, the firm makes its decisions about advertising expenditures
(as a part of marketing costs) in advance of its price-setting decision. This deci-
sion is premised on the firm's experience in its market: it may choose to attain
(or maintain) primacy by outspending its competition, thus creating barriers to
market entry by new firms, or it may respond to the level of advertising of com-
peting firms in its market. Yet such spending —whether on marketing, research
and development, corporate salaries, etc. —is tempered, ultimately, by the price
the firm believes it can charge for its product.
Many descriptions of the healthcare industry's pricing behavior tend to lump
its many segments in what is presumed to be a homogeneous group. Yet this
industry is composed of many discrete subgroups that are differentiated by the
unique character of its products. Uniqueness confers market power and increases
the price that the consumer must pay. When consumers have more choices,
the price they are willing to pay for the product figures more prominently in the
selection. Many of the important commodities available in the healthcare indus-
try are pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The pharmaceuticals market includes
drugs available directly to the consumer, i.e., those purchased "over-the-counter,"
and those where the patient's agent (physician, surgeon, dentist, etc.) makes the
selection, i.e., prescription or "legend" drugs ("legend" refers to an FDA label-
ing requirement that prescription-only status be declared on the product's label).
The percent of total output for a market manufactured by the top firms is referred
to as "concentration ratio," e.g., the four-firm or the eight-firm concentration ratio.
Based on the 1982 Census of Manufacturers from the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, the four largest drug companies manufacture 26% of total output; the eight
largest firms account for nearly 41%. Drug manufacturers do not generally com-
pete with one another on an industry-wide basis; further differentiation is main-
tained by the therapeutic uses of the drug. For example, the four-firm concentration
ratio for duodenal ulcer therapy is greater than 80%, and the four-firm concentra-
tion ratio for human recombinant insulin is 100%. High concentration ratios indi-
cate an anticompetitive structure for the industry. Economic theory suggests that
if concentration ratios are high, implicit collusion (keeping prices in line with those
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of the competition) is more likely to occur. At the very least, coordination of pric-
ing is easier to manage.
Three other market segments are of note: new drugs, "me-too" drugs, and
generic equivalents. Patent protection provides innovator firms with monopoly
power (and monopoly prices) for the duration of the patent, and often long after-
wards.35 These firms have made major investments in research and development
and often justify their high prices by these costs. Other firms copy innovator firms'
drugs, using minor chemical manipulations to evade the innovator's patent. These
"me-too" drugs have lower research and development costs, although introduc-
tory prices for "me-too" drugs tend to be higher than for the innovator prod-
uct,36 After patents expire, U.S. firms are allowed to produce generic equivalents
with a. much lower regulatory burden than that for innovator drugs. Other coun-
tries, such as Canada,37 mandate cross-licensing of innovator drugs so that gener-
ics are available during the term of the innovator's patent protection. In contrast
to the innovator and "me-too" market segments, firms are more likely to com-
pete on price in the generic market segment, and consumer prices are likely
to be lower. Note, however, that the U.S. innovator rarely competes on price with
the generic equivalent.
The market structure we have described is an oligopoly — a structure in which
entry of new firms is difficult (barriers are created by high research and de-
velopment expenses, high advertising expenditures, and major regulatory hur-
dles) and few firms compete with one another.38 As described by Tirole, it is a
market where prices are higher than if the barriers (such as advertising) were
lower. But he cautioned: ". . . such correlations should not be interpreted as causal
relationships. Advertising does not increase profits, and profits do not generate
advertising."39
Does an Ethical Basis for Organization-Industry Conflict Exist?
Nonscientific promotional advertising may induce less-than-optimal prescribing
practices and may be cost increasing to the consumer. In contrast, dissemination
of unbiased information may be cost decreasing and may lead to improved out-
comes. Given that advertising can have price and quality consequences to con-
sumers, what ethical principles should guide the Society in structuring its
relationship with the healthcare industry? We examine the tetrad of ethical prin-
ciples ("Georgetown mantra"40) popularized by Beauchamp and Childress41 —
respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice.
In fostering autonomous decision making, the healthcare professional, in pro-
viding information to or making judgments for patients, has obligations to avoid
controlling constraints and to make full disclosure: "Because of the unequal dis-
tribution of knowledge between professionals . . . and patients . . . the principle
of respect for autonomy entails that professionals have a prima facie obligation
to disclose information, to ensure understanding . . . and to foster adequate
decision making."41 A professional's reliance on biased information or acceptance
of gratuities —thereby establishing an obligation with the giver that may be in
conflict with or prevail over the professional-patient relationship42 — seems to
violate the principle of autonomy. By extension, participation by a society rep-
resenting professionals in activities yielding biased information seems also to
violate this principle for patients served by society members.
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Societies and Healthcare Industry Ethical Conflicts
The second principle of nonmaleficence — one ought not to inflict evil or harm—
is similarly violated through reliance on biased information. In selecting a course
of therapy for a patient, the professional is expected to make an "optimum" choice,
where time to desired outcome, side effects, and costs are minimized. If the choice
is less than optimal, then avoidable harm may befall the patient.
The third principle of beneficence — preventing or removing evil or harm, pro-
motion of good— suggests a direct obligation to provide best information and to
avoid side effects or cost-increasing relationships. Beauchamp and Childress noted
a further obligation in beneficence, that of seeking the best balance between ben-
efits and unavoidable harms. Informational bias or conflicting obligations under-
mine the professional's abilities to make the best choice.
The last principle is that of justice —fair allocation of burdens and benefits.
Chren et al.42 assumed that advertising, including gifts such as beach bags, trips,
or textbooks, is cost increasing and noted, "it is unjust to have a system in which
patients pay for gifts that benefit doctors and drug companies/' They suggested
that the injustice is worsened by wealth disparities between patient and physi-
cian. Their assessment seems to be congruent with violations of Rawls's,43 prin-
ciples of equal access and fair equality of opportunity working to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged. Thus, acceptance of gifts or financial support by
the healthcare professional, and by extension the Society, from, industry may
violate the principle of justice.
In the situation described by Chren et ah, individual healthcare practitioners
are the recipients of industry attention. In accepting whatever largess is offered,
it appears that each of the tetrad of ethical principles can be violated. Are there
circumstances under which the Society could accept support from a healthcare
firm, without violating these principles?
Remedies: Formulation of the Society's Policy
The healthcare industry's advertising activities and their associated costs can
have undesirable or desirable consequences, depending on their promotional
or information character. Do the policies adopted by the Society (Table 1) pro-
vide an ethical basis for healthcare industry support of the Society's educational
activities? Most of the elements of the policy are directed toward removing bias
from the relationship: multiple company sponsorship, reliance on unrestricted
grants-in-aid, Program Committee control of program topics and speakers, and
elimination of collateral bias from cosponsorship. One item was provided in
recognition that the best speakers on a topic may be biased. Under this circum-
stance, speaker bias should be disclosed. An item has been incorporated into the
program evaluation questionnaire to determine if the audience perceived undis-
closed bias, and results from the program evaluation are used in making future
speaker selections.
The Society's policy does not address the issue that acceptance of healthcare
industry support for educational activities may be cost increasing. In the pre-
ceding sections, however, we have presented an analysis that suggests a rela-
tionship between promotional versus informational advertising and cost effects
(Table 2). This analysis suggests that by confining its industry-sponsored edu-
cational events to those that are informational, Society acceptance of industry
support for the event is at least neutral and may be cost decreasing.
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Table 1. California Society of Hospital Pharmacists Policy
on Industry Sponsorship of Educational Events.
1. Multiple company sponsorship shall be sought for society-sponsored events.
2. The Society proactively solicits healthcare industry support of educational events in the
form of unrestricted grants-in-aid.
3. The Continuing Education Program Committee shall select program speakers, topics,
and program format with the goal of maximizing objectivity, balance, and scientific rigor
of the material presented.
4. Speakers shall disclose affiliations with the healthcare industry per established Society
disclosure policy.
5. Material from Society-sponsored Continuing Education programs shall not be used for
future promotional activities by anyone, unless express written consent is given by the
Board of Directors.
6. The Society shall not cosponsor educational activities with other organizations unless
these policies are followed by all such sponsoring organizations.
7. The Program Committee for Society-sponsored events shall determine, through an item
in the program evaluation, if there was perception of undisclosed speaker bias. Results
of this evaluation shall be reviewed in selecting speakers for future programs.
Conclusion
We have described concerns that advertising, including informational and pro-
motional types, is biased and cost increasing and suggestions that biased infor-
mation is both presented and relied upon. Reliance upon informational advertising
is reasonable and is at least cost neutral. Advertising costs do factor in the price
of products as a "fixed" cost. The healthcare market is highly segmented with
opportunities for real and perceived product differentiation. This differentiation
shifts consumer or agent preference to higher priced products. If reliance is made
on biased information or the agent receives gifts (other than unbiased informa-
tion) from the healthcare industry, the patient's agent violates several ethical
obligations. The Society similarly violates these obligations if it participates un-
critically in the distribution of biased information or accepts industry support for
this participation. In contrast, the Society, in providing unbiased educational
events, can reduce the search costs for information and can contribute to patient
welfare. Acceptance of industry support for educational activities following the
described policy is appropriate.
Table 2. Influence of Advertising on Price of Products.
Promotional Informational
Cost increasing Yes ?
Cost neutral or decreasing ? Yes
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tion guidelines to prevent drug companies from illegal promotions). Wall Street journal 1992 Nov.
25: B3(W), B7(E), col. 4.
30. Food and Drug Administration. Draft Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educa-
tional Activities. 57FR56412-414.
31. See note 5. Anonymous. 1992;57(2):87-94.
32. Deakin EB, Maher MW. Cost Accounting. 2nd ed. Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1987.
33. Brigham EF. Financial Management. Theory and Practice. 4th ed. Chicago: Dryden Press, 1985.
34. Sutton J. Sunk Costs and Market Structure. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992.
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tion, savvy selling to extend products' lives. Wall Street Journal 1992 Jul. 14: B4, col. 3.
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peterian competition. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1987;491-525. See note 5. Anonymous.
1992;57(2):87-94.
37. Gorecki PK. The importance of being first. The case of prescription drugs in Canada. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 1986;4:371-95.
38. Kohler H. Intermediate Microeconomics: Theory and Applications. 3rd ed. Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
Foreman and Company, 1990.
39. See note 25. Tirole. 1988.
40. Pellegrino ED. The metamorphosis of medical ethics. Journal of the American Medical Association
1993;269:1158-62.
41. Beauchamp XL, Childress JF. Principles ofBiomedical Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
42. See note 1. Chren, Landefeld, Murray. 1989;262:3448-51.
43. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Commentary: Klaus M. Leisinger
There are and have always been differ-
ent opinions on what the role of the
healthcare industry should be, which
kind of marketing practices are consid-
ered to be appropriate, and which prices
are just. For example, many people
in society and government institutions
generally consider that prices of phar-
maceuticals are too high, whereas those
in the healthcare industry are usually of
a different opinion. The industry argues
that its advertising and promotion are
beneficial to both society and the cor-
porate world, whereas critics such as
Hazlet and Sullivan argue that it may
be biased and cost increasing, poten-
tially violating ethical obligations such
as autonomy, nonmaleficence, benefi-
cence, and justice.
Controversial judgements are a nat-
ural and positive consequence of plu-
ralistic societies, and bias is a natural
consequence of individual interests and
value judgements. The dogma of the
"ethical neutrality" of science and tech-
nology, as an uncritical belief, says that
science is (ideally) objective. Objectiv-
ity here means that the scientist should
provide disinterested information about
facts and not permit an intrusion of his
or her subjective values, i.e., the de-
scription, interpretation, explanation,
and prediction are scientific activities
and should be free of all values, espe-
cially ethical values. Serious people,
however, have given up this dogma and
admit that everybody is committed to
certain values that undoubtedly influ-
ence the issues explored, questions
asked, and range of variables consid-
ered. Each advocate of a specific view-
point can substantiate his opinion by
citing and referring to relevant empiri-
cal studies.
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Societies and Healthcare Industry Ethical Conflicts
The traditional commentary one
would expect from, somebody associ-
ated with the healthcare industry is to
contradict the notion of a direct link
between advertising expenditures and
drug prices. One could argue that the
healthcare industry is a highly regulated
industry, and pressures from both the
marketplace and from governments in-
fluence corporate pricing policy. The
competitive environment compels the
companies to operate efficiently. Simi-
larly, budget restraints and concerns
about access to healthcare impel gov-
ernments to demand delivery of cost-
effective new drugs. Although a variety
of factors influence the ultimate price of
a pharmaceutical product, in the United
States, the price is determined primar-
ily by the market, whereas in most
European countries, it is heavily influ-
enced by government agencies.1
Moreover, there is ample empirical
evidence on the value of advertising.
For example, one can quote a recent un-
questionable testimony—the report of
the U.S. Government Office of Techno-
logical Assessment on Pharmaceutical
R&D: Costs, Risks and Reward —which
cites a study referring to the positive im-
pact of advertising: ''advertising and
promotion outlays may serve to realize
the goodwill inherent in an innovation.
The value lies in the innovation itself;
promotion, like production and dis-
tribution, is necessary to unlock that
value."3
One could also argue that advertising
and promotion enhances the competi-
tiveness of the marketplace by provid-
ing necessary information to consumers,
be they healthcare professionals, regu-
latory agencies, or patients. Through
marketing activities, the industry can
inform medical professionals of the
products' benefits and risks, promote
effective utilization of its products, and
inform the public of useful innovations.
This again can be seen as improving
the transparency of the industry and
providing the necessary tools for better
decision making by healthcare profes-
sionals. So much for the traditional way
of looking at things!
Regarding the practices of advertising,
the "beauty" may well remain in the eye
of the beholder —however, there are
definitely limits. In my aesthetic judge-
ment, there can be no beauty at all in
practices such as offering frequent flyer
miles for prescriptions or cash reim-
bursements to pharmacists for switch-
ing patients from, one brand to another,
the most blatant examples mentioned
by the authors.
But to be fair, one should see that it
takes two to tango: the one who bribes
and the other who can be bribed. Like
Edmund Pellegrino,41 am under no illu-
sion that all healthcare professionals
necessarily "share a common devotion
to a high-flown set of ethical principles."
As he stated: "We are all too good at
rationalizing what we want to do that
personal gain can be converted from.
vice to virtue."5 Pharmacists accepting
money for switching patients or medi-
cal doctors accepting all-expense-paid
trips to Monte Carlo to attend an "edu-
cational symposium" are not morally
superior to those who offer such favors.
My spontaneous proposal with re-
gard to the problem of trips would be
to hold educational events in academic
surroundings such, as universities and
not in luxury vacation resorts. This
would separate the wheat (those inter-
ested in education) from the chaff (those
interested in holidays paid by some-
body else), and this separation would
bring the costs of such symposia down
considerably.
Healthcare goods, and especially
Pharmaceuticals, are not commodities
in the sense of other consumer or in-
vestment goods. They are used because
people are sick or in pain, or because
they have physical or mental disorders,
or because they are dying. Consumer
sovereignty, the freedom to choose or
245
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
4:
57
:3
9,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
09
63
18
01
00
00
49
77
Klaus M. Leisinger
refuse a product, is limited in markets of
the healthcare industry. The resulting
ethical responsibility for all involved in
health care, i.e., for regulatory authori-
ties, medical doctors, pharmacists, and
particularly industry, is pronounced.
Safety and risk/benefit assessments that
the healthcare industry makes can have
particularly fateful properties: if indus-
try's specialists or managers err, they err
not just for themselves and their com-
panies but for the sick people.6
A healthcare company is well ad-
vised—in addition to strictly adhering
to the comprehensive laws governing
this industry— to develop corporate pol-
icies and codes of conduct, e.g., for its
promotional and educational activities.
These policies must enforce high stan-
dards of communication with the med-
ical professions and with the public.
In addition to generally accepted ap-
proaches such as the Code of Phar-
maceutical Marketing Practices of the
International Federation of the Phar-
maceutical Manufacturers' Association
(IFPMA), the European Code of Prac-
tice for the Promotion of Medicines, and
the World Health Organization's Ethical
Criteria for Medicinal Drug Promotion,
company-specific guiding principles
should be developed to govern promo-
tional activities. CIBA Pharmaceuticals,
to give one example, has developed a
Marketing Communication Policy and
"Guidelines for Adequate Interpreta-
tion and Correct Implementation of the
Marketing Communication Policy" to
tackle specific issues such as "appropri-
ateness of communication" (e.g., by
nonmedical celebrity spokespersons in
public media7), "sponsoring, gifts8 and
samples" or "hospitality.9" Their com-
pliance is monitored and controlled in-
ternationally by a full-time marketing
communication auditor and, in many
subsidiaries, by Promotional Quality
Improvement and Assurance circles or
similar bodies.
Permanent dialogue with medical
and consumer groups can help to seek
shared understanding about the impor-
tance of specific criteria in such codes
of conduct, to review them periodically,
and to adapt them as necessary.
Are these safeguards sufficient? The
hard truth remains: as long as there are
human beings making decisions, "cor-
porate misconduct, like the lowly cock-
roach, is a plague that we can suppress
but never exterminate."10 The sugges-
tion brought forth by Hazlet and Sulli-
van to formulate a policy of Hospital
Pharmacists on Industry Sponsorship
should be supported because it helps
to create transparency with regard to
interests involved in educational events
supported by the healthcare industry.
If one would have to list the most im-
portant factors to prevent blatant unethi-
cal behavior of any person or institution,
transparency would be at the top of
the list.
Notes
1. Because pricing is a minor aspect of Hazlet
and Sullivan's paper, it will not be pursued
here in detail. For a detailed presentation of
the pharmaceutical industry's point of view
with regard to pricing see Interpharma/MPS,
eds. Individual Responsibility and Social Solidar-
ity in Europe. A Workable Combination. Basel
Medizinisch-Pharmazeutische Studiengesell-
schaft/Interpharma 1993.
2. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-
ment. Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks and
Reward. Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1993:102, footnote, 34;
OTA-H-522.
3. Hurwitz MA, Caves RE. Persuasion or infor-
mation? Promotion and the shares of brand
name and generic pharmaceuticals. Journal of
Law and Economics 1988;31:299-320.
4. Pellegrino ED. The virtuous physician, and
the ethics of medicine. In: Beauchamp L, Wal-
ters L, eds. Contemporary Issues in Bioethics. 3rd
ed. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1989:
316-22.
5. See note 4. Pellegrino. 1989:321.
6. Leisinger KM. Corporate ethics. In: Dinkel R,
Horisberger B, Tolo KW, eds. Improving Drug
Safety—A Joint Responsibility. New York:
Springer, 1991:47-57.
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Societies and Healthcare Industry Ethical Conflicts
7. The Ciba policy says here, 'The use of non-
medical celebrity spokespersons in product
communication should be avoided/'
8. With regard to gifts, the Ciba policy says,
"Gifts offered to health care professionals
should primarily entail a benefit to patients
or be related to the physician's work or ed-
ucation. They should not be of substantial
value and should not represent a financial in-
ducement/7
9. The Ciba policy says here, "A reasonable level
of hospitality is permissible. . . . Hospitality
extended to participants in a scientific meet-
ing must be subordinate to the main scien-
tific objective of the event/'
10. Gellerman SW. Why "good" managers make
bad ethical choices. Harvard Business Review
1986;64(Jul./Aug.):85-90.
Commentary: Laura Gardner
Introduction
Widespread attention is being focused
on the healthcare industry's interaction
with healthcare professionals in the pro-
motion of pharmaceuticals and other
types of products. The main area of con-
cern is the societal impact of various
promotional activities, i.e., the amount
and direction of the effect of such activ-
ities on prescription costs and the eth-
ics of promotional activities vis-a-vis
their influence on physician prescribing
behavior. These issues have led to the
development of the California Society
of Hospital Pharmacists' new policy.
The Society's concerns in developing
this policy mirror those of an increas-
ing number of medical societies, includ-
ing the American College of Physicians,
the American Medical Association, and
the Association of American Medical
Colleges.1"3
Drs. Hazlet and Sullivan's discussion
of the ethical considerations and cost
impact of the industry's promotional
activities provides the contextual back-
ground for the California Society of
Hospital Pharmacists' policy. My com-
mentary further explores the ethical
and cost issues with particular emphasis
on the complex ethics of the patient-
physician contract and develops a gen-
eralized hierarchical framework for
ranking the societal acceptability of in-
dustry-sponsored promotional activities
based on the degree of bias in their in-
formational content and their potential
impact on healthcare costs.
The activities included in the hierar-
chical framework are 1) financial support
of educational programs, 2) sponsorship
and organization of educational pro-
grams, 3) detailing to practicing phy-
sicians, 4) distribution of medication
samples, and 5) gifts. Financial support
of research is another industry activity
with ethical implications but is not dis-
cussed in this forum. Recent policies
developed by medical societies are re-
viewed in light of the hierarchical frame-
work presented.
The Patient-Physician Contract
Physician as Agent
Physicians act on behalf of their patients,
selecting among treatment options after
considering a patient's medical needs
and financial resources.4 The physician
thus serves as both a clinical and an eco-
nomic agent of the patient.
Concerns about the effect of promo-
tional activities on physician practice be-
havior are grounded in the ethics of the
physician's role as agent. Physicians are
obligated to choose the best treatments
for their patients, on the basis of scien-
tific merit, not because they were the
recipient of gifts or biased promotional
information. Research has provided ev-
idence that the concern about the prac-
tice behavior effects of promotional
activities is a legitimate one.5"11 Physi-
cians appear to be strongly influenced
by promotional activities, although they
staunchly deny the existence of such in-
fluence.12 Such massive self-delusion
on the part of many physicians is per-
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Laura Gardner
haps the most worrisome feature of the
interaction between the industry and
the medical profession because it cur-
tails the ability of the profession to be
self-monitoring.13 Thus one can argue
that promotional activities that influ-
ence physician behavior through means
other than establishing the scientific
merit of the product are a detriment to
society.
It is important to consider the trade-
offs that must be negotiated for physi-
cians to fulfill their ethical obligations
to patients. For example, given finite
economic resources, beneficence (the
imperative to provide all possible good
for a particular patient) often conflicts
with justice (the imperative to provide
equally high-quality care to all patients).
Neither gifts to the physician nor infor-
mation provided during promotional
activities benefit patients directly. How-
ever, in evaluating the acceptability of
such activities the potential indirect ben-
efits, such as enhancement of the phy-
sician's knowledge of new therapeutic
options, must be considered.
One of the main conflicts that phy-
sicians face is the need to maintain max-
imal availability to patients and still
spend the time necessary to keep up to
date with medical science. Physicians
generally agree that they never have as
much time as they would like to criti-
cally review the latest research stud-
ies and clinical articles. The costs (both
in time and resources) of acquiring
needed information can be substantial.
Thus, promotional activities that serve
to reduce information costs by provid-
ing necessary and valid information
to physicians are potentially of benefit
to society.
Physicians' Legitimate Self-Interest
In the literature addressing the physi-
cian's role, there has been next to no
discussion about the issue of physicians'
legitimate self-interest. McCulough pio-
neered the argument that the physi-
cian's legitimate self-interest is a valid
concept that is compatible with the phy-
sician's ethical obligations to the patient
and must be taken into account in consid-
ering the ethics of the patient-physician
contract.14 McCullough argued that le-
gitimate self-interest comprises both
1) mundane requisites for good patient
care such as "the time to study, reflect,
and learn and the time to rest and to
maintain an alert mind" (p. 12) and
2) obligations to persons and responsi-
bilities outside the medical network,
such as family and community. Physi-
cians face a conflict between the need
to keep informed so as to provide the
best quality patient care and the need
to rest, recreate, and spend time with
friends and family. These needs are
distinct from what McCullough terms
"mere" self-interest, including for ex-
ample, remuneration for its own sake.
Thus, one can argue that there is inher-
ent benefit in activities such as educa-
tional symposia that permit physicians
to balance efficiently the conflicting
needs of patient care and their legiti-
mate self-interest.
Hierarchical Framework
The proposed hierarchical framework
ranks industry-sponsored promotional
activities on the basis of three charac-
teristics: 1) the potential impact of the
activity on prescription costs, 2) the po-
tential degree of bias in the information
presented^ and 3) the potential of the
activity to offset costs at a societal level
(see Table 1).
Prescription Costs
Drs. Hazlet and Sullivan have argued
that the industry sets a product's price
so as to cover the expected costs of con-
ducting those promotional activities that
have been deemed necessary to position
that particular product and that the cost
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Societies and Healthcare Industry Ethical Conflicts
of promotional activities therefore can
be considered a fixed cost for the indus-
try. Thus, regardless of the impact of
the promotional activities on physician
prescribing behavior, no impact on pre-
scription costs would be expected over
the short term. However, over the lon-
ger term, any activity that has proven
to enhance a company's ability to in-
crease or maintain market share proba-
bly will continue to be included in the
budget, thus perpetuating a certain
level of both fixed costs and product
prices.
Thus, for a promotional activity to
provide a net benefit to society, it must
be shown to offset societal costs over the
longer term through some other means.
In fact, promotional activities with an
educational component may indeed
offset societal costs by reducing physi-
cians' information costs. However, ac-
tivities with educational content must
be further .evaluated with regard to their
reliability and extent of bias.
Reliability and Bias
Educational information is lacking in
reliability when the material presented
is from uncontrolled trials or industry-
sponsored research that is not peer
reviewed by experts outside of the in-
dustry or when the information is sim-
ply inaccurate. Bias exists when the
information is accurate but one sided or
incomplete. Information that is lacking
in reliability presents no net benefit to
society and may result in a product be-
ing prescribed in a less than optimal
manner, or to patients who will not ben-
efit, or to an extent that is not warranted
by the true advantages of the product.
Inaccurate information fosters unfair
competition that puts companies that
play by the rules at a disadvantage.
In contrast, biased information may
give a company a competitive advan-
tage within the approved market for the
product, i.e., an increased likelihood of
that company's product being pre-
scribed in preference to its competitors.
This is actually free-market competition
at its finest and will be counterbalanced
by the promotional efforts of the com-
pany's competitors. Activities that pre-
sent a balanced educational content are
of course preferable to those that are
biased, but even biased material has
value if it is accurate and if the physi-
cian is active in seeking alternate points
of view.
Potential to Offset Societal Costs
Information that is accurate but biased
may reduce information costs if there is
sufficient opportunity for physicians to
balance the information received. How-
ever, promotional activities that facilitate
dissemination of reliable information in
a nonbiased manner will reduce infor-
mation costs to a greater extent and are
clearly preferable. Distribution of med-
ication samples is more problematic
than promotional activities with educa-
tion content. Although costs are lower
for patients who receive the samples,
the cost of the samples is borne by soci-
ety through the contribution of fixed
costs to product prices and because hav-
ing started the patients on the samples,
familiarity and habit may lead physi-
cians to continue to prescribe the higher
cost alternatives.15 The short-term ben-
efit to selected patients must be bal-
anced against the greater societal cost.
The detriment to society would be min-
imized, however, if physicians were
careful to ensure that availability of
medication samples did not influence
therapeutic choices.
Review of Recent Policy
Developments
Numerous medical societies recently
have developed position papers or
guidelines regarding the relationship
between physicians and the pharma-
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Table 1. Healthcare Industry
Activity
Targeted
behavioral
outcome
Potential impact
on prescription
costs
Financial support for medical symposia
or CME meetings (includes non-
controlling financial sponsorship or
subsidization of the meeting, honoraria
for speakers, hosted dinners and social
hours, and travel support for attendees;
does not include programmatic
influence on speaker or topic selection)
Sponsorship and organization of medical
symposia or CME meetings, including
selection of speakers or lecture topics
Product information presented to
physicians during detailing visits or
published in journals, monographs,
and teaching aids
Distribution of medication samples
Gifts given during detailing visits,
giveaways at conventions and
conferences, inducements to physicians
to recommend formulary placement of
a particular product
Increased prescribing
of the company's
product through
brand recognition,
subliminal loyalty
Increased prescribing
of the company's
product through the
influence on clinical
judgment
Increased prescribing
of the company's
product through the
influence of clinical
judgment
Increased prescribing
of the company's
product through
familiarity or
acquired habit
Increased prescribing
of the company's
product through
brand recognition or
subliminal loyalty
Neutral over the short
term; longer term may
reinforce continued
high industry
promotion budgets
Increasing over the
short term, if physi-
cians are diverted from
prescribing lower cost
equivalents; longer
term may reinforce
continued high indus-
try promotion budgets
Increasing over the
short term, if physi-
cians are diverted
from prescribing
lower cost equiva-
lents; longer term
may reinforce con-
tinued high industry
promotion budgets
Decreasing, for patients
who receive free sam-
ples instead of pur-
chased medication;
increasing, if physicians
are diverted from pre-
scribing lower cost
equivalents or for
patients not receiving
samples
Increasing over the
short term, if physi-
cians are diverted
from prescribing
lower cost equiva-
lents; longer term
may reinforce con-
tinued high industry
promotion budgets
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Societies and Healthcare Industry Ethical Conflicts
Promotional Activities.
Potential degree
of bias in
information presented
Potential to offset Net
societal costs through benefit
decreased information costs to society
Low, assuming peer-reviewed research Strong, depending on the quality
and non-industry-based selection of of the educational content of the
educational content of meeting information presented
Likely to be moderately high unless
peer reviewed and multiple company
sponsorship
Moderate to strong, depending
on the quality of the educational
content
Likely to be high for any one company
but balanced overall
Moderate, depending on the
quality of the educational content
No information is presented None
No information is presented None
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Laura Gardner
ceutical industry. The basis for the
guidelines is the recognition that "a
responsible and productive alliance
between the medical profession and the
pharmaceutical industry is unquestion-
ably beneficial to medical progress/'16
In general, the guidelines have the fol-
lowing common elements:
1) Gifts to physicians are not accept-
able if there are strings attached,
if their value is more than mini-
mal and there is no educational
content, or if acceptance might un-
dermine or appear to undermine
the objectivity of the physician's
judgment.
2) Subsidization of medical education
conferences is permissible if pay-
ment is not made directly to par-
ticipating physicians (but instead
takes the form of a reduced regis-
tration fee, for example), if the con-
ference organizers are not affiliated
with the industry, and if there are
explicit policies to maintain inde-
pendent control of program con-
tent and selection of faculty.
3) The content of educational pro-
grams should be objective and,
whenever possible, balanced. Hos-
pitality and amenities should not
be excessive. Sponsorship, affilia-
tions, faculty honoraria, and other
potentially biasing factors should
be disclosed to program partici-
pants.
The proposed hierarchical framework
appears to fit well with the policy rec-
ommendations that the medical societies
have developed. The five promotional
activities that were evaluated under this
framework fall easily into the hierar-
chy of acceptability, with noncontrolling
financial support for medical symposia
at the most acceptable end of the spec-
trum and gifts and inducements to
physicians the least acceptable. The
framework makes it evident that the
main mechanism for offsetting societal •
costs is through decreased information
costs, assuming that the degree of bias
in the information presented is taken
into account.
Physicians have an obligation to
maintain both the appearance and the
actual practice of objective decision
making and sound clinical judgment.
Promotional activities by the healthcare
industry can be evaluated by application
of the proposed framework of accept-
ability. When participating in activities
with a strong potential for bias, such as
detailing visits, physicians are ethically
obligated to minimize bias by seeking
to balance the information received with
information from other sources. The
most acceptable promotional activities
are those that incorporate an educa-
tional component with an unbiased or
fully balanced content, thus facilitating
a responsible and ethical relationship
between physicians and the industry.
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Commentary: William E* Fassett
Hazlet and Sullivan's foray into a daunt-
ing ethical thicket presents an excellent
review of the important considerations
regarding industry support of profes-
sional societies. I would like to add a
discussion of trust to their list of rele-
vant principles.11 will confine my com-
ments otherwise to the distinction they
advance between promotional and in-
formational activities. First, I am not
sure that the economic distinction they
make helps resolve the ethical questions
facing professional associations regard-
ing their relationships with the pharma-
ceutical industry. Second, and perhaps
more important, I do not know that any
ethical position on this issue can be
grounded solely in facts about cost.
As Hazlet and Sullivan noted, the
distinction between promotional and
informational advertising is fuzzy. Man-
ufacturers must provide factual informa-
tion about their products to prescribers
and dispensers, and they may not mis-
lead professionals about the nature of
their products. These obligations are
ethical as well as legal. However, the
test of what is misleading is difficult to
apply. For example, not all information
about "unlabeled uses'' of legend drugs,
although legally considered false and
misleading, is factually misleading, and
one may imagine ethically justified dis-
closures about these uses. Furthermore,
one person's "puffery" is another per-
son's legitimate point of view: what is
the information content of "Made in
USA"?
However, Hazlet and Sullivan have
added a second part to their distinction,
that promotional advertising is cost in-
creasing whereas informational adver-
tising is cost neutral at worse. But a key
purpose behind promotion is to in-
crease the unit sales of the promoted
product, and promotion is very often
undertaken because of the economies of
scale that result. So, activities in which
"quality difference of little merit are em-
phasized" are cost increasing only if
they are ineffective in achieving these
economies.
Moreover, not all informational activ-
ities are cost neutral. Information about
truly new and effective therapies results
in these therapies being applied. Newer
therapies are often more expensive than
older ones, and the availability of newer
therapies has helped fuel a rapid in-
crease in healthcare costs. Hazlet and
Sullivan may really have meant that
promotional activities are distinguish-
able from informational advertising in
that the former increase cost without a
corresponding increase in direct medi-
cal benefit.
This still leaves us with the problem
of inter subjective evaluations of bene-
fits derived from, similar products. In
addition, it is not clear that direct med-
ical benefits are the appropriate mea-
sure of the ethical status of industry
advertising. Consider two examples.
Example 1: Activity A increases the
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price consumers pay for Drug D but
does not contribute to the safe and ef-
fective use of Drug D nor does Drug D's
use confer any direct medical benefits
for consumers over the use of lower-
priced Competitor C. This seems to fit
Hazlet and Sullivan's definition of cost-
increasing promotion. The net result of
Activity A is to increase the profits of
the manufacturer of Drug D. Because
these profits are not merited, Hazlet and
Sullivan would prohibit Activity A in
conjunction with Pharmacy Society P.
Example 2: Activity B informs pre-
scribers of the fact that Drug E is thera-
peutically superior to Competitor C for
at least some patients; these patients
pay more for Drug E but consider it a
worthwhile expense. If we add that the
use of Drug E avoids other expenditures
by patients who use it, then Activity B
seems to become "informational" adver-
tising that is cost neutral or cost decreas-
ing and ethically allowable. Assuming
that Competitor C and Drug E have
equal production costs, the net result of
Activity B is to increase the profits of the
manufacturer of Drug E. This increase
in profits is merited and is ethically al-
lowable. Activity B could presumably be
undertaken in conjunction with Phar-
macy Society P.
But both examples feature increased
industry profits. The industry uses prof-
its from products like Drug D to support
the research that results in products like
Drug E. They also use profits to support
philanthropy and to provide newer
drugs to needy patients at reduced
rates. Finally, the industry uses its prof-
its to support organizations like Phar-
macy Society P. These are indirect
benefits to consumers.
What finally creates difficulty in sup-
porting the distinction made by Hazlet
and Sullivan is the realization that the
industry support for Society P comes
only from profits generated by the sales
of industry products. In any analysis,
the support for the Society is a cost to
industry borne by patients. If the sup-
port does not result in increased sales
or reduced industry expenditures else-
where, then the support could be dis-
continued and the money saved used
to reduce the price of products. Thus,
the justification for industry support of
Society P must rest on the benefits pro-
duced by Society P, not on the cost of
that support.
Drug industry executives have ethi-
cal obligations to many persons besides
ultimate consumers. Employees and
their families depend on the success of
the industry, and many argue that the
prime obligation of executives is to pro-
duce an appropriate long-term return
on investment to shareholders. If indus-
try support of Society P results in ben-
efits only for the Society, and none at
all to the firms, i.e., its support is ut-
terly untainted by any expectation of
benefit, then one can imagine that the
industry executives involved are guilty
of violating the trust placed in them by
shareholders and employees.
Perhaps we will conclude that Soci-
ety P should take no industry funds in
any form, but that its activities should
be entirely funded from its members,
who owe their patients the duty of par-
ticipating in Society P for the benefits
their patients can derive therefrom.
Money otherwise spent by the indus-
try can be used to reduce the cost of
drugs for patients generally. The cost of
Society P's operations will be trans-
ferred to its professional members, who
may then seek to increase their own in-
comes by increasing patient charges. Ul-
timately, the ethical justification for
these charges rests not in their source,
but in their application. Society P, and
its members collectively, must be sure
that its expenditures provide real bene-
fits to the ultimate payors.
Professionals are ethically impelled to
refuse gifts that are little more than
bribes to divert their loyalty from their
patients to industry sponsors. They
254
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e .
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
4:
57
:3
9,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s .
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
09
63
18
01
00
00
49
77
Societies and Healthcare Industry Ethical Conflicts
must also equip themselves with ade-
quate means to actually discern the true
value of industy products for their pa-
tients. If they continue to accept indus-
try support for professional activities,
then they must accept the responsibil-
ity to spend that support wisely, and in
their patients' actual interests. They
may not use an economic distinction
between "promotional" and "informa-
tional" advertising to conceal the fact
that they are accepting industry support
that results only and ultimately from
their patients' health resources.
Note
1. Pellegrino ED, Veatch RM, Langan JP, eds.
Ethics, trust, and the professions: philosophical and
cultural aspects. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 1991.
Commentary: Jon R« May
The article by Hazlet and Sullivan pro-
vides a timely and valuable contribution
to. the literature on the subject of medi-
cal ethics. For far too many years, the
pharmaceutical industry has attempted
to persuade medical and other allied
health practitioners to use their prod-
ucts through promotional techniques,
such as gifts, honoraria, and travel sup-
port, rather than by honest discussion
of therapeutic differences between their
product and those of competitors. It is
apparently easier to garner the good will
(and business) of practitioners by show-
ering them with benefits and gifts than
by "educating" them to the benefits to
their patients by using Company A's
product over Company B's product.
Through a review of the relevant lit-
erature on the subject of drug product
advertising and promotion, Hazlet and
Sullivan have amply demonstrated that
pharmaceutical industry promotional
activities (e.g., payment for attendance
at industry-sponsored educational sym-
posia and cash inducements for pre-
scribing expensive drugs in promotions
designated by the promoter as "clinical
studies" but failing to meet the criteria
of true clinical studies) are not only cost
increasing for the therapy provided but
many of them present biased data
meant to mislead practitioners. The pre-
ponderance of the published studies
show that physicians rely more on drug
industry promotional information than
on their own review of published clini-
cal trials or review articles. It does not
take a genius to figure out why that hap-
pens—the former approach is quicker
and "time is money."
As Hazlet and Sullivan state, the dis-
tinction between industry sponsored
educational and promotional activities
is of concern to everyone, including the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) who is interested in scientific in-
tegrity and who holds the belief that
the patient's best interest is first and
foremost. The FDA has been concerned
for a long time with the promotional
activities of pharmaceutical manufac-
turers/distributors. The FDA intends to
monitor the educational activities of the
industry more thoroughly in the future,
applying the principles spelled out in its
recent proposal and highlighted by
Hazlet and Sullivan.
The authors have presented adequate
evidence that drug industry promo-
tional advertising may induce less-
than-optimal prescribing practices and
probably does result in more expensive
drugs, thus increasing costs to the con-
sumer. Obviously, neither of these are
desirable attributes. As Hazlet and Sul-
livan state, "In contrast, dissemination
of unbiased information may be cost
decreasing and may lead to improved
outcomes." Thus, it is inevitable that
professional associations, such as the
California Society of Hospital Phar-
macists (CSHP), must adopt a policy
that will ensure, to the greatest extent
possible, the removal of bias from the
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professional association-industry rela- grants-in-aid, and Program Committee
tionship. The seven components of the control of program topics and speakers,
CSHP Policy Statement ("California So- constitute a reasonable and workable
ciety of Hospital Pharmacists Policy on approach to ensure that only unbiased
Industry Sponsorship of Educational educational events are presented. In
Events"), including multiple company this scenario, the patient is the ultimate
sponsorship, reliance on unrestricted winner.
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